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Figure 1. Agricultural land transfer to different types of entities 
Note: 2017 data is mid-year value while all others are end-of-year values. 
Sources: Data before 2010 are from chinaaidr.com (2018), 2010~15 data are from Agricultural Development 
Reports, 2016~17 data are from MOA (2018).
THE SCARCITY of arable land is a deϐining feature of Chinese agriculture (Zhang and Li 
2018). In 2015, China fed 18.9 percent 
of the world’s population with only 
8.5 percent of the world’s arable land. 
Furthermore, the limited agricultural 
land resource in China is distributed 
to 231 million households, resulting in 
an average farm size of only 0.96 acres 
per household (China Agricultural 
Development Report 2016), and even 
such small farms are usually scattered 
in several separate plots. Therefore, 
China faces two challenges: (a) 
preserving the quantity and quality of 
its arable land amid rapid urbanization; 
and, (b) consolidating land to increase 
agricultural productivity. China’s recent 
rural land reforms on these two aspects 
have implications not only for China, but 
the entire world.
Rural Land Conversion for Urban 
Use: National Policy and Local 
Innovation  
To achieve food security, the Chinese 
government tightly controls the net 
amount of arable land converted to 
other uses, with the overall goal of 
maintaining at least 307 million arable 
acres (called the “redline”) by 2020. In 
addition to the annual quota allocated 
by the central government, additional 
arable land converted to other uses has 
to be compensated by new arable land 
of at least equal area. 
As environmental regulations 
tighten, the Chinese government 
increasingly turns to rural construction 
land, such as that beneath farmhouses, 
for compensation for converted arable 
land (State Council 2004). Currently, 
most regions in China achieve this kind 
of compensation through administrative 
means (Southern Weekend 2010). 
Local governments choose the locations 
and move farmers from sprawling 
farmhouses to high-rise buildings 
and re-cultivate the land beneath the 
original farmhouses to arable land. 
The farmers lose their farmhouses 
(including future development rights), 
retain the land use right of the land 
beneath farmhouses for agricultural 
production, and gain an apartment 
and/or monetary compensations. The 
increases in arable land become permits 
for local governments to convert arable 
land near cities for urban development 
and sell urban land use rights for 
revenue.    
The city of Chongqing has 
experimented with an innovative 
market-oriented process featuring 
“land tickets” (Chongqing Municipal 
Government 2016). Farmers in remote 
rural areas can voluntarily consolidate 
farmhouses and re-cultivate arable 
land. In doing so, they create “land 
tickets” which are then auctioned off to 
developers as permits to develop arable 
land near the city. The key difference 
between Chongqing and the rest of 
China is that farmers’ decisions to 
convert land beneath their farmhouses 
to arable land, and the compensation 
for the conversion, is determined by the 
market as opposed to command-and-
control (although the city government 
often buys large amounts of “land 
tickets” to prevent the price from 
crashing). This innovation has the 
potential to increase the equity and 
efϐiciency of land conversions.
Rural Land Transfer Reform and 
the Booming Rental Market
Small farm size and low productivity 
can be ameliorated by letting farmers 
transfer farmland to others for 
agricultural production. Rural land 
transfer has been permitted since the 
1980s and has increasingly gained 
government support over the years. 
In 2002, the Land Contract Law of 
China conϐirmed the right for farmers 
to transfer land use rights. As Figure 2 
shows, the total amount of land transfer 
increased from ϐive percent of arable 
land in 2007 to 36.5 percent in 2017. An 
important driving force for this increase 
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Who owns China’s farmland?
Private land ownership is banned in China. Under China’s 
current Household Responsibility System (HRS), started in 
the early 1980s, all rural land is owned by rural collectives, 
which allocate contract rights for parcels of farmland to 
eligible households. The tenure of contract rights was 15 
years in 1983, renewed for 30 years in 1997, and again by 30 
years (i.e., starting 2027) in China’s 19th Party Congress in 
2017 (NPC 2017).
Chinese Farmers Can:
 Decide what to plant and how
 Keep returns from their agricultural production
 Lease their land to others for agricultural production
Chinese Farmers Cannot:
 Convert agricultural land to other uses
 Leave their land uncultivated for more than two years
 Legally resist land acquisition
is that migrant farmers want to work in 
cities while keeping their land at home.
 The majority of land transfers 
happen between farmers. For example, 
migrant farmers may let friends or 
relatives farm their land. These kinds 
of transfers often rely on informal 
agreements, and usually involve zero 
or very low payments. Although not 
land rental per se, these informal 
transfers lay the ground for the future 
development of the rental market by 
consolidating small plots and making 
them attractive to large-scale farms. 
Currently, land transfers to ϐirms 
represent 10.5 percent of all transfers 
(or 3.8 percent of all arable land), 
but their growth has been slow in 
recent years. An important factor is 
that property rights of rural land are 
insecure and unclear. This is manifested 
in inaccurate land borders and sizes, 
incomplete land use right certiϐicates, 
and limited HRS tenure (see ϐirst text 
box). The Chinese government just 
extended HRS tenure to 2057, and is 
in the process of issuing land use right 
certiϐicates with more accurate land 
position and size information. This 
effort is expected to boost the land 
rental market in the future.
Implications for China’s Crop 
and Livestock Industries
The percentage of urban population 
in China increased from 19 percent 
in 1980 to 57 percent in 2016 (China 
Statistical Year Book 2017), and is 
continuing its upward trend. Despite 
signiϐicant demand for farmland acres 
to be converted for urban development, 
China has successfully maintained the 
quantity of its arable land in recent 
years (China Agricultural Development 
Report 2017). This is due to policies 
that compensate arable land lost to 
development by creating arable land 
somewhere else, often by converting 
farmhouses to arable land. The fact that 
returning rural construction land to 
cropland can generate valuable permits 
for urban development somewhere 
else creates additional opportunity 
cost for facilities for animal production. 
This opportunity cost is ϐirst felt by 
municipal governments who depend on 
selling development rights for revenue. 
In most of China, local governments 
restrict or delay the approval of new 
animal production facilities, especially 
those with a larger footprint, mandate 
the conversion of farmhouses to arable 
land, and move farmers into high-rise 
buildings. In Chongqing, farmers also 
have this opportunity cost because they 
can create and sell permits themselves 
by voluntarily converting their 
farmhouses to cropland. Therefore, 
no matter how the system is designed 
speciϐically, the overall effect is to make 
animal production more expensive. 
While this affects all producers, the 
negative effects will be stronger on 
small, low-proϐit producers. 
The increased opportunity cost 
for animal production is especially 
relevant for the hog industry. In 
southern China, land available for hog 
production is already so scarce that 
some hogs are produced in high-rise 
buildings, a phenomenon unheard of in 
the United States (Agweb.com 2017). 
Furthermore, in order to protect the 
environment, the government has 
designated areas where hog production 
is restricted (USDA 2017). The extreme 
land scarcity and the increasing cost 
of environmental compliance will 
compound with increased opportunity 
cost of maintaining the facility and limit 
hog production. 
Similarly, the development of the 
rental market gives less productive 
crop producers an incentive to quit 
agricultural production. Currently, 
renting farmland is popular with 
farmer households, but offers limited 
appeal to ϐirms. The current reform 
that clariϐies property rights may draw 
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